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MAINTAINING CRITICAL RULES TO ENABLE
SUSTAINABLE COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURES
Barbara A. Cherry*
INTRODUCTION
Under traditional monopoly regimes in the United States, the
combination of regulatory requirements imposed on
telecommunications carriers enabled the development and
sustainability of telecommunications infrastructure that was widely
available, affordable and reliable. With the transition from monopoly
to competitive regimes, some regulatory requirements within the
industry-specific telecommunications regime had to be modified to
continue pursuit of underlying policy goals. For example, universal
service policy was modified in the Telecommunications Act of 1996
to shift reliance from implicit subsidies within the rate structure to a
combination of explicit funding mechanisms and rate rebalancing.1
However, explicit funding mechanisms have presented their own
sustainability problems.2
Further deregulatory telecommunications policies are also shifting
the boundaries between the traditional industry-specific (common
carriage/public utility) and general business legal regimes, but in ill-
defined ways and with considerable conflict in interpretation among
the courts. This is exemplified by considerable disagreement and
uncertainty related to judicial interpretation of the preexisting savings
* Professor, Department of Telecommunications, Indiana University.
1. Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S. Wildman, Review of Federal Universal Service Policy in the
United States, in MAKING UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY: ENHANCING THE PROCESS THROUGH
MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUATION 167, 167-69 (B. Cherry, A. Hammond & S. Wildman, eds., 1999).
2. See Barbara A. Cherry, Back to the Future: How Transportation Deregulatory Policies
Foreshadow Evolution of Communications Policies, 24 THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 273, 283
(2008).
3. Barbara A. Cherry, Consumer Sovereignty: Redrawing the Boundaries Between Industry-Specific
and General Business Legal Regimes for Telecommunications and Broadband Access Service 13-31,
Paper presented at the 35th Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (TPRC 2007), Arlington,
VA (2007).
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clause in section 414 of the Communications Act of 1934 as well as
interpretation of the new antitrust-specific savings clause in section
601(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC's Truth-in-
Billing rules and its savings clause, and the savings clause for state
regulation in section 332(c)(3)(A) related to CMRS services.4
Perhaps most notable is the FCC's classification of broadband access
services as information services in its Cable Modem Declaratory
Ruling5 and Wireline Broadband Access Order,6 and thereby not
subject to common carriage regulation under Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934. These FCC orders have triggered
debate regarding important issues collectively referred to as network
neutrality.
7
I have previously asserted that mischaracterizations of the law of
common carriage and its relationship to other bodies of law have
created a foundational problem for constructive discourse of
deregulatory policies for communications technologies in general
8
and for network neutrality in particular.9 The mischaracterizations lie
in an inadequately understood and misrepresented description of the
lineage of legal principles that evolved in the United States to address
differing forms of access problems. 10 More specifically, the
mischaracterizations arise because the statutory regime-instead of
the common law-is misidentified as the original regulatory regime
of common carriage. 11 Such mischaracterizations have led "to a
conflation of the legal bases for addressing access problems for end
4. See id. at 13-29.
5. See generally Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband
Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem
Declaratory Ruling].
6. See generally In the Matter of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet
Over Wireline Facilities, Universal Service Obligations of Broadband Providers, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853,
14,858 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Access Order].
7. Barbara A. Cherry, Misusing Network Neutrality to Eliminate Common Carriage Threatens Free
Speech and the Postal System, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 483, 501 (2006).
8. See Cherry, supra note 2, at 277-281.
9. See Cherry, supra note 7, at 500-03.
10. Id.at 500.
11. Id.at50l.
[Vol. 24:4
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MAINTAINING CRITICAL RULES
user customers and competitors. As a result, there is a preoccupation
with regulation of the provider-to-provider relationship, and
unsubstantiated reliance on antitrust principles to address provider-to-
customer access problems."' 2 Furthermore, such preoccupation with
the provider-to-provider relationship, or wholesale market, and
antitrust theory is symptomatic of an analytical failure to consider
critical issues of policy sustainability.13 Yet, based on a historical
analysis of the evolution of legal rules and the effects on network
infrastructures in the United States, I have asserted that the
sustainability of deregulatory telecommunications policies will likely
require retention of elements of the common law principles of
common carriage and public utilities.
4
This article builds on this prior work, utilizing a complexity theory
perspective for both framing the inquiry and guiding analysis, to
examine the fundamental question as to what legal rules are
necessary for the sustainability of critical communications
infrastructures that generate the desired emergent properties of
widespread availability, affordability and reliability. This paper
asserts that, just as a market economy requires an institutional
infrastructure to sustain it, critical network infrastructures with
desired emergent properties require specific legal rules for their
sustainability. Historically in the United States, infrastructures
providing varying types of essential services, such as transportation
and communications, were governed by principles embedded in
common carriage and public utilities. These legal principles were left
intact under deregulatory policies for transportation,' 5 but have been
eliminated for broadband by the recent FCC rulings that triggered the
network neutrality debate.' 6 Thus, this article asserts that, properly
framed, the network neutrality debate in the United States is
symptomatic of the need for a deeper inquiry as to the critical legal
12. Id. at 500.
13. Id. at 503.
14. Id. at 504.
15. See Cherry, supra note 2, at 278-281.
16. See, e.g., Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 5; Wireline Broadband Access Order,
supra note 6.
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rules necessary for sustainable communications infrastructures with
certain desired properties.
In search of identifying such critical legal rules, analysis starts with
examination of policy developments in the United States. It stresses
that a historically accurate understanding of legal developments in
the United States reveals the importance of common law principles of
common carriage and public utility law-which include imposition of
ex ante requirements on providers in the retail market-in generating
the desired emergent properties of widely available, affordable and
reliable transportation and telecommunications infrastructures. It also
shows how recent FCC policy decisions affecting broadband access
services, whereby common carriage obligations are not imposed in
either the wholesale or retail markets, is a radical departure from the
deregulatory policies that have been adopted for transportation as
well as narrowband telecommunications networks. It is the
elimination of the common law scaffolding for application to
broadband infrastructure that has triggered the current network
neutrality debate; yet, at the same time, it is the misleading discourse
of network neutrality that not only masks the significance of the
inapplicability of the common law principles in the retail broadband
market but also blocks inquiry into the legal rules in the retail market
that may be necessary for the desired network properties to emerge.
This article also incorporates prior research stressing the
importance of liability rules on economic incentives to invest in
performance, such as network reliability, of communications
systems. 17 In this respect, liability rules for telecommunications
carriers in the United States evolved along a unique trajectory,
differing in substantial ways from that of all other common carriers.' 8
17. See generally Barbara A. Cherry, Improving Network Reliability-Liability Rules Must
Recognize Investor Risk/Reward Strategies, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS: INSTITUTIONAL
RESPONSES TO NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 309, 309-33 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Steven S.
Wildman eds., 2003) [hereinafter Improving Network Reliability]. See also BARBARA A. CHERRY, THE
CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER LIABILITY: HISTORICAL REGULATORY FLAWS AND
RECOMMENCED REFORM (1999) [hereinafter CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER LIABILITY].
18. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 311-14; CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 14-28.
[Vol. 24:4
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MAINTAINING CRITICAL RULES
As a result, under deregulatory policies, the shift in the liability
regime for telecommunications carriers is also unique, posing
potential liability for catastrophic losses (previously capped under
tariffs) and threatening the long-term sustainability, reliability, and
ubiquity of communications infrastructures. 19 Although the need for
unique liability rules for technologies of high-risk high-reliability
organizations has been acknowledged in other contexts-such as
nuclear power plants-it has thus far been inadequately considered
by policy making bodies in the United States for application to
communication networks.2 °
This article concludes that further research is vital for improving
our understanding of those critical legal rules necessary for the
sustainability of communications network infrastructures with the
desired emergent properties of widespread availability, affordability
and reliability. As research progresses, we may better understand
how the U.S. common law principles of common carriers and public
utilities, which historically addressed certain forms of demand-side
failures, were an important means of fulfilling this function.
Furthermore, their elimination through deregulatory policies, but
without replacement by some other legal rules to fulfill a similar
function, may render unsustainable the development of critical
communications infrastructures with the desired emergent properties.
I. FRAMING INQUIRY FROM A COMPLEXITY THEORY PERSPECTIVE
Changes in communications technologies and services-
particularly with development of digital technology and the
Internet-coupled with the transition from monopoly to competitive
regulatory regimes have created a fundamental shift in their
governability. 21 This reality undermines the appropriateness of the
19. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 317-24.
20. See id. at 318-21; CISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 60-
66.
21. Barbara A. Cherry, The Telecommunications Economy and Regulation as Coevolving Complex
Adaptive Systems: Implications for Federalism, 59 FED. COMM. L. J. 369, 373-74 (2007) (hereinafter
The Telecommunications Economy]; Barbara A. Cherry & Johannes M. Bauer, Adaptive Regulation:
20081
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traditional policy analysis paradigm, based on optimizing some
measure of societal preferences reflected in an objective function.
Instead, a new paradigm of policy analysis must be developed that
expressly recognizes the need for, and difficulties of, designing
sustainable telecommunications policies.
In seeking a new paradigm, Bauer and I assert that a complexity
theory perspective facilitates our ability to appreciate the difficulties
of designing sustainable telecommunications policies for regulatory
regimes based on competition rather than monopoly.22 "[I]f the
telecommunications sector and the legal/policymaking institutions are
viewed as coevolving and complex adaptive systems, then there are
important implications for regulatory policy."23 Implications include
a greater appreciation of the diminishing capacity to achieve
specifically desired outcomes, and the unpredictability of efforts to
influence trajectories of economic sector performance. 24 "Instead,
greater focus must be placed on how to design policies and
policymaking processes that are more suitable for interacting with,
interpreting, and responding to the telecommunications sector over
time. 25
Complex systems are nonlinear, dynamic systems. Complexity
theory refers to the component areas of study that address distinctive
properties of complex systems:
These properties include: catastrophes resulting from
discontinuity in sudden jumps in behavior, chaos resulting from
unstable aperiodic behavior and sensitivity to initial conditions;
uncomputability because system output transcends rules;
irreducibility because system behavior can not be understood by
Contours of a Policy Model for the Internet Economy 5, Paper presented at the ITS Fifteenth Biennial
Conference, Berlin, Germany (2004) (on file with Georgia State University Law Review).
22. The Telecommunications Economy, supra note 21, at 371. Sustainable policies are defined "as
rules that are politically adoptable and for which the desired policy goals are reasonably likely to be
achievable." Adaptive Regulation, supra note 21, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
23. The Telecommunications Economy, supra note 21, at 371.
24. Id. at371-72.
25. Id. at 372.
[Vol. 24:4
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decomposing the system into parts; and emergence of order that
spontaneously develops as collective properties from interacting
system components. By contrast, simple systems are
characterized by predictable behavior, few interactions and
feedback/feedforward loops, centralized decision making, and
reducibility.26
Complex systems have rules, or limitations, that govern their
behavior to keep the systems from becoming chaotic. 27 Furthermore,
in complex adaptive systems (CAS), system feedback enables the
system to learn from experience and to adapt to changes in the
system's environment.28 In this way, a CAS can actually change its
own rules.
Complexity theory enables us to perceive behavior of social
systems from a different frame of reference. In so doing, it provides
new ways of interpreting phenomenon and framing questions for
research.29
A. Importance of Legal Infrastructure for Sustainability of
Economic Activities Generally
"Complex systems are characterized by global structure and local
randomness. The global structure maintains the strength of the whole.
The local randomness creates innovation and resilience. In free
market economies, competition is the source of local randomness,
and regulation maintains the global structure." 30 The spontaneous
order that emerges from complexity in free markets is the basis of the
26. Id. at 380 (footnote omitted).
27. EDGAR E. PETERS, COMPLEXITY, RISK, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 52 (1999).
28. Id. at 50-51,160.
29. For example, from a complexity theory perspective, federalism is a patching algorithm that
provides mechanisms for both innovation within patches (policy making within states) and order (policy
making by the federal government) that are necessary for an adaptive and resilient governance system.
Deregulatory policies of complete federal preemption of state authority should be approached with
caution for such policies eliminate the mechanisms for innovation and experimentation within the states.
The Telecommunications Economy, supra note 21, at 399-402.
30. PETERS, supra note 27, at 6.
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HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 953 2007-2008
) I I G  
 
  
 
    
l    
i ility.26 
953 
  ,    
    
i  l     
t  t  l r  fr  i   t      
t '  .     
 
  i   
t    t  .   
      
ch.2  
. t e   tr cture t i ability f 
lly 
l      
r .  l l t t   t   
 l l r ss t  i ti  .  
 ,    , 
  ,,30  
  it    
. !d.   . 
.  . , I , I L ). 
. !d. t , 16 . 
29. For exa ple, fro  a c le it  t e r  ers ecti e, f r lis  i   t i  l rit  t t 
r i es is s f r t  i ti  it i  t  li  i  )  
aking by the federal govern ent) that are necessary f r a  a a ti e  r sili t r  t . 
eregulatory policies f co lete fe eral ree tion f st t  t rit  l   r  it  
caution for such policies eli i ate t e is s f r i ti   ri t ti  it i  t  t t . 
he eleco unications c y, s r  t  , t - . 
. , ra t  , t . 
7
Cherry: Maintaining Critical Rules to Enable Sustainable Communications I
Published by Reading Room, 2008
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"invisible hand" described by Adam Smith.3' In other words,
economic efficiency resulting from a free market economy, as if by
an "invisible hand," is an emergent property of a market economy
(under certain conditions).
An institutional infrastructure provides the global structure to
sustain the market economy. Referring to the rise of the Western
World, North states that "[t]he economic institutional structure was
made possible by the evolution of polities that eventually provided a
framework of law and its enforcement. Such a framework is an
essential requirement for the impersonal exchange that is necessary
for economic growth. 32 As for modern markets, Fligstein asserts that
"[o]ne cannot overestimate the importance of governments to modern
markets. Without stable, more or less non-rent-seeking states,
modem production markets would not exist."
33
Government plays a critical role in "societal solutions to the
problems of property rights, governance structures, conceptions of
control, and rules of exchange., 34 Through provision of various
bodies of law, such as property rights and contract principles, as well
as governance structure for their enforcement, government provides
institutional prerequisites for market exchange and economic
development.35
Yet, the rule of law-or limits on government power-is also
necessary for the sustainability of market capitalism.36 Constraints on
government power are particularly important to protect investors who
31. Id. at 4.
32. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 133 (2005).
33. NEIL FLIGsTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-
FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 3 (2001).
34. Id. at 97.
35. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 153-72 (2000). See also William Kovacic, Institutional
Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 265,269-72 (2001).
36. See NORTH, supra note 32, at 83-85, 133-36. See also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF
LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 97 (2004); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 77 (2003).
[Vol. 24:4
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are vulnerable to expropriation of their investments in the sunk costs
of utility infrastructures, such as telecommunications networks.
37
With recent efforts to transition from planned economies,
economists have increasingly been concerned with understanding
how the necessary process of institutional evolution will occur to
support market economies. For example, Hoff and Stiglitz find that
mass privatization of state enterprises was premature in Russia
because conditions of asset-stripping weakened the capacity of the
state to enforce the rule of law.38 Similarly, Kovacic stresses the
institutional prerequisites required by transition economies to support
economic development. 39 The necessary legal reform includes the
creation of a private property rights system, establishment of contract
principles and enforcement mechanisms, recognition of varying
forms of business enterprises, promotion of capital formation, and
facilitation of the exit of assets and their redeployment through
bankruptcy procedures.4 °
Conversely, with the .pursuit of deregulatory policies in well-
developed market economies, some economists assert that the role of
government has been rolled back too far. Stiglitz states that there
needs to be a balance between the role of government and the market,
and that a country can suffer from underregulation as well as
overregulation.4 1 In this regard, he asserts that in the United States
deregulatory policies of the 1990's have, albeit unintentionally,
created a less stable economy.42
37. See generally BRIAN LEVY & PABLO T. SPILLER, REGULATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
COMMITMENT: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1996).
38. Karla Hoff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, After the Big Bang? Obstacles to the Emergence of the Rule of
Law in Post-Communist Societies, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 753, 759-62 (2004).
39. Kovacie, supra note 35, at 269-70.
40. Id.
41. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST
PROSPEROUS DECADE 87-114 (2003).
42. Id.
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B. Importance of Legal Infrastructure for Sustainability of Network
Infrastructures
Just as insights from complexity theory enable us to better
understand the critical role of legal rules and governance structure in
providing an institutional infrastructure to sustain a market economy
and to reap the benefits of its "invisible hand" emergent property, it
can also enlighten inquiry as to the critical legal rules and governance
structure necessary for sustainable communications infrastructures.
Key insights of complexity theory particularly relevant here are that
one of the distinctive properties of complex systems is emergence,
and that emergent properties evolve from rules that govern system
behavior to keep it from becoming chaotic.
Applying these concepts, this article asserts that widespread
availability, affordability, and reliability of critical communications
infrastructures are desired emergent properties of such
infrastructures, and that specific legal rules are necessary to provide
the institutional infrastructure for the sustainability of critical
communications networks that generate such desired emergent
properties. The central question then becomes: what exactly are those
legal rules necessary for communications infrastructures to generate
the desired emergent properties? Relatedly, what specific functions
must those rules serve so as to enable generation of the desired
emergent properties?
II. EXAMINING THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR SUSTAINABLE
UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURES IN THE UNITED STATES
In search of identifying such critical legal rules, this section
reviews aspects of my prior historical analyses of the evolution of
legal rules and the effects on network infrastructures in the United
States which form the basis for my assertion that the sustainability of
deregulatory telecommunications policies will likely require retention
of elements of the common law principles of common carriage and
[Vol. 24:4
HeinOnline -- 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 956 2007-2008
956  I  I  l. :  
 t nce / t re/ i bility / t  
tructures 
  
   
l t r   
  l  t  
   
  l  i  . 
 l rly  
 ce, 
   
  
 
   ti s 
  t ties   
t res,  l  r   
l    
ti s    t 
  l   
  ti s   
    
  
t  
   E   
 S    
   
    
 t res  
 it  f 
l t r  i ations  
   l s    
10
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol24/iss4/2
MAINTAINING CRITICAL RULES
public utilities.43 It stresses the importance of the common law
principles embedded in the traditional industry-specific regimes
under which the transportation and telecommunications network
infrastructures developed. Although the industry-specific regimes
were augmented at times through enforcement of legal rules under
antitrust and consumer protection laws applicable to general
businesses, it also stresses the importance of understanding the
temporal sequencing in the coevolution of the industry-specific and
general business statutory regimes. Importantly, the general business
statutory regimes of antitrust and consumer protection largely post-
!date the industry-specific regimes for common carriers and public
utilities.
The significance of the industry-specific regimes pre-dating the
general business regimes is that many analyses of deregulatory
policies (that eliminated key elements of the common carriage and
public utility regimes) falsely assume that the general business
regimes can adequately solve industry-specific problems that such
regimes did not evolve to address. These analyses are particularly
problematic when focusing primarily on antitrust type remedies for
the wholesale market, ignoring that the resultant shift in the
interrelationship of the industry-specific and general business
regimes under deregulatory broadband policies may generate legal
gaps for issues affecting the retail market for consumers that may no
longer be adequately addressed by either regime.
A. Differential Evolution of Industry-Specific and General Business
Regimes in the United States
As a starting point, it is important to recognize some basic trends
in the general evolution of regulation in the United States, which is
elsewhere discussed in greater depth. 44 As a general matter,
43. See Cherry, supra note 7.
44. Barbara A. Cherry, Pursuing Telecommunications Legislation Through a Systems Approach to
Policymaking Processes 1-2, Paper presented at the World Multi-Conference on
Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics, Orlando, FL (July 8-11, 2007).
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government regulation has evolved institutionally in response to
limitations of the existing regime to adequately respond to
technological, economic, and societal changes. More specifically,
primary reliance started with the common law, shifting during the
Industrial Revolution to increasing reliance on statutory law, and
resulting for some industries in the delegation of regulatory authority
to administrative agencies. Furthermore, within the progression of
institutional change, new bodies of law have evolved and changed
over time. The main bodies of law under the common law consisted
of torts (including common carriage), contracts, and property;
whereas, the establishment of corporations and administrative
agencies, for example, are of statutory origin, and statutory
requirements were enacted more frequently over time to address
inadequacies of common law requirements and remedies. Moreover,
the co-evolution of institutional change and bodies of law has created
coexisting industry-specific and general business regulatory regimes,
among which the interrelationships change over time.
Within these general trends, the institutional progression of both
the industry-specific (common carrier and public utility) and general
business (antitrust and consumer protection) regimes has many
similarities. These include placing initial reliance on the common
law, increasing reliance on statutory law, delegating some
enforcement to administrative agencies, and creating the coexistence
of federal and state regulation.
Yet, there are important differences in the institutional progression
of these respective regimes. For the industry-specific regimes relative
to the general business regimes, both the relevant common law and
statutory law developed earlier. Furthermore, for the industry-specific
regimes, state regulation preceded federal regulation with the
expansion of intrastate to interstate commerce during the nineteenth
century, and state administrative agencies were established prior to
the relevant federal agencies with a primary focus on protecting
consumers. In this regard, the Report of the Senate Select Committee
on Interstate Commerce ("Cullom Report") concluded that federal
legislation for the regulation of interstate transportation of railroads
[Vol. 24:4
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was necessary and expedient because, among other things: state
regulation was ineffective as interstate commerce was beyond the
jurisdiction of the states under the United States Constitution;
common law remedies were inadequate to address the myriad forms
of discrimination imposed on customers; and statutory regulation was
likely to be ineffective without providing adequate machinery, here a
commission, for its execution.45 As a result, the Interstate Commerce
Act was enacted in 1887, creating the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) with jurisdiction over railroads.46 ICC jurisdiction
was extended to telegraphy and telephony in 1910, and subsequently
replaced by the FCC in 1934. 47
However, for the general business regime, the federal statutory
regimes preceded the state statutory regimes, and initially to protect
business competitors before consumers.48 For example, the Sherman
Act was enacted (after the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887) in 1890,
creating the first federal antitrust statute. 49 Both the Clayton Act and
the Federal Trade Commission Act were enacted in 1914, with the
latter creating the FTC (whereas the ICC was created in 1887) but its
authority directed for the purpose of protecting business
competitors. 50 It was not until the Federal Trade Commission Act
45. S. REP.NO. 49-46, pts. I & 2 (1886).
46. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, repealed by Pub. L. 95-473, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1467
(1978).
47. The Communications Act of 1934, creating the FCC, was based on the statutory framework
created in the Interstate Commerce Act and copied much of the language nearly verbatim. Act of June
19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, repealed by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (1996).
48. See J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial
Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 347,350-58 (1992).
49. The Sherman Act prohibited certain forms of monopolization as well as agreements or
conspiracies in restraint of trade. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
50. The Clayton Act was the first federal statute that expressly prohibited certain forms of price
discrimination, and was further amended by the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936 to assure that, "to the
extent reasonably practicable, businessmen at the same functional level would stand on equal
competitive footing with regard to price." Donald S. Clark, The Robinson-Patman Act: General
Principles, Commission Proceedings, and Selected Issues, Speech presented before the Ambit Group
Retail Channel Conference for the Computer Industry, San Jose, CA (1995). The Robinson-Patman Act
applies to the sale of commodities, and not to the sale of services-such as rail and telecommunications
services. Harvey I. Saferstein, An Overview and Update of the Federal and State Law of Price
Discrimination, 1485 PRACTICING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. HANDBOOK SERIES 135, 169-79 (2005).
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was amended in 1938 that the FTC was given the responsibility to
regulate unfair and deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce for
the purpose of protecting consumers. In the 1960's and 1970's,
Congress passed numerous statutes to protect consumers against
unfair practices, and increased enforcement and regulatory authority
of the FTC. Yet, it was not until the 1960's and 1970's, at the FTC's
urging, that most states adopted statutes to curb unfair or deceptive
acts and practices. Some state statutes directly provided private
causes of action and associated remedies, whereas some other state
legislatures gave state courts a mandate to create a common law of
unfair trade practices. 5' The enactment of such state statutes for
general consumer protection purposes long post-dates the creation of
the state commissions governing common carriers and public utilities
that were established with jurisdiction over telecommunications
beginning in the late nineteenth century and in the majority of states
by the 1920's.
B. Relevance ofDifferential Evolution to Issues of Consumer
Sovereignty
Averitt and Lande define consumer sovereignty "as the state of
affairs in which consumers have an unimpaired ability to make
decisions in their individual interests and markets operate efficiently
in responding to the collective effect of those decisions." 52 They
assert that antitrust and consumer protection laws share a common
purpose to facilitate the exercise of consumer sovereignty or effective
consumer choice. 53 Antitrust law is intended to ensure that a
meaningful range of options is available to consumers through
market competition. Consumer protection laws seek to protect the
ability of consumers to freely choose among such options.
51. See Franke & Ballam, supra note 48, at 355-424.
52. Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and
Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 722-23 (1997).
53. Id. at 723.
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The antitrust and consumer protection laws are applicable to
general businesses. The industry-specific regimes of common carriers
and public utilities were designed to address issues of consumer
sovereignty by significantly different means, for which the relevant
administrative agencies have primary jurisdiction, often preempting
the applicability of the general business regime.
With respect to consumer sovereignty, the basic trends in the
general evolution of regulation in the United States have specific
characteristics. Perhaps most fundamentally, the general business
regime of antitrust and consumer protection laws coevolved with-
and largely post-dates-the development of the industry-specific
legal regimes for common carriers and public utilities that originated
with railroads and was subsequently applied to telecommunications.
54
Recognition of this temporal sequence is critical, as the statutory
general business regime evolved as an adjunct to the industry-specific
statutory regimes. As a result, in numerous cases and circumstances
the general business regime has been preempted or superseded by the
industry-specific regimes, and, for such situations, further evolution
of the general business regime thereby addressed issues not covered
by the traditional industry-specific regimes. Therefore, as the
traditional industry-specific regimes change under deregulatory
policies, the resulting interrelationships between the industry-specific
and general business regimes necessarily shift. In some ways, the
general business regime may now have greater applicability to the
"deregulated" industries, but it is unclear whether the general
business regime will adequately address the situations or
circumstances that had previously been addressed by the traditional
industry-specific regimes. For this reason, deregulatory policies may
generate a "legal gap" for which some issues may no longer be
adequately addressed by either the general business or the
deregulatorily adjusted industry-specific regimes.
54. For a comparison of the evolution of the legal regulatory regimes for the telecommunications and
transportation sectors, see Cherry, supra note 2.
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C. Importance of Common Law Principles
As discussed at length in prior work,55 the original regulatory
regime for common carriers and public utilities in the United States
evolved under the common law. Common carriers, merely by virtue
of their status as public employments, or public callings, bore unique
obligations under tort law to serve upon reasonable request without
discrimination, to charge just and reasonable prices, and to exercise
their calling with adequate care, skill and honesty. 56 They were also
subject to a common law rule of strict liability, except for damages
arising from acts of God or war, and with severe limitations on the
ability to contract out of such tort liability. The common law of
public utilities subsequently evolved in the United States during the
nineteenth century, incorporating the tort obligations of common
carriers to which was added an affirmative duty to extend facilities to
provide service with a corresponding barrier to exit.57 To enable
public utilities to remain financially viable while satisfying these
additional obligations, they were protected from competitive entry
typically through monopoly franchises.
Statutory regimes arose in the United States during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when common law remedies
became inadequate to address the economic abuses of large
corporations. 5 8 Industry-specific statutory regimes included the
creation of expert administrative agencies to which regulatory
authority was delegated by the legislature. 59 The statutory regimes
arose initially for railroads and were later adopted for telegraph and
telephone companies.
60
55. Barbara A. Cherry, The Political Realities of Telecommunications Policies in the US.: How the
Legacy of Public Utility Regulation Constrains Adoption of New Regulatory Models, 2003 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 757, 761-67 (2003) [hereinafter Political Realities]; Barbara A. Cherry, Utilizing "Essentiality of
Access" Analyses to Mitigate Risky, Costly and Untimely Government Interventions in Converging
Telecommunications Technologies and Markets, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 251, 256-58 (2003)
[hereinafter Essentiality of Access]; Cherry, supra note 2, at 275-277.
56. Essentiality ofAccess, supra note 55, at 257.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 258.
59. Id
60. Id
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The common law legal principles-also, importantly, retained
under the statutory regimes-evolved to address specific types of
access problems regarding essential services or facilities.6 The
common carrier obligations evolved to address problems of economic
coercion between the carrier and its customers, whereas the
additional public utility obligation to serve was imposed to assure the
availability of an essential service to all customers.62
The common law obligations of common carriers can be seen as an
early form of consumer protection, later codified into statutory
industry-specific regimes, that long predates the enactment of
consumer protection laws applicable to general businesses in the
United States.63 Furthermore, public utility obligations can be viewed
as an early form of welfare state regulation, given the purpose to
better ensure availability of an essential service, that also long
predates the more commonly recognized rise of the welfare state after
the Great Depression. 64
1. Importance of Public Utility Principles
Deregulatory policies in the transportation sector began in the
1970's, encouraged by a shift in political philosophy favoring
competition over regulation and by the rise of intermodal competition
accelerated by the technique of containerization. 65 In this regard,
deregulatory transportation policies modified the statutory regimes
but retained important components of the common law regimes. Each
mode of transportation-rail, air, and motor carrier-is still
statutorily defined as common carriers. Specific elements of the
61. Id. at 259.
62. Additional legal principles later evolved to address yet other types of access problems regarding
essential services or facilities: the essential facilities doctrine to address refusals to deal with
competitors; universal service programs to ensure access to targeted end users; and viewpoint diversity
as a government goal to justify regulation of owners of channels of communication to effectuate free
speech rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Essentiality ofAccess, supra
note 55, at 257-62.
63. See Cherry, supra note 3, at 7-10.
64. Political Realities, supra note 55, at 770-71.
65. See Cherry, supra note 2, at 278.
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common carriage obligations-to serve upon reasonable request,
without unreasonable discrimination, at reasonable prices, and with
adequate care-are still imposed, although their manner of
expression and enforcement varies by mode and among services or
customers within modes. The deregulatory transportation regimes
also contain mechanisms that continue to serve public utility
functions, including a combination of entry and exit requirements,
government ownership of infrastructure and/or carriers, and universal
service subsidy programs to benefit targeted groups of customers or
areas. As with the common carriage obligations, the manner in
which the public utility functions are addressed varies by mode as
well as among customers within modes.
However, some of the mechanisms established to fulfill public
utility functions are having recurring sustainability problems.66 For
example, Congress's current approach to intercity passenger rail
service-the most significant component of which is Amtrak-is
considered unsustainable at historical funding levels. In addition,
trends in the aviation industry and rising costs are jeopardizing the
long-term viability of the Essential Air Service program that provides
subsidies to induce new or additional air service to communities.
In some ways, deregulatory policies in the telecommunications
sector have followed a similar trajectory to that in the transportation
sector. "There is increasing variance as to how common carriage
obligations are being applied among providers of new services
enabled by digitization and the Internet; [and] the current funding
mechanism for federal universal service support fund is generally
considered economically unsustainable in the long run."
67
In terms of whether critical infrastructures will continue to be
generally available throughout the country, the sustainability
problems of the post-deregulatory mechanisms intended to serve
public utility functions are a significant problem for both the
transportation and telecommunications sectors. Shifting primary
66. Id. at 283.
67. Id. at 274.
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reliance from implicit subsidies contained in price structures of
regulated monopolies to explicitly funded subsidy programs is
proving to be a less politically stable regime.68 The greater political
instability of residualistic (targeted) as opposed to universalistic
benefit programs--even though the former tend to be less
expensive-has long been recognized by political scientists.69 The
greater political stability of universalistic programs is illustrated by
the long periods during which monopoly legal regimes-whether by
privately or publicly owned infrastructures-prevailed. It remains
unclear whether the economic-political dynamics underlying
sustainable policies can over time provide societally acceptable levels
of available critical transportation and telecommunications
infrastructures under deregulatory, competitive legal regimes.
2. Importance of Common Carriage Obligations
In other ways, deregulatory policies in the telecommunications
sector are treading a trajectory that differs from that in the
transportation sector. Perhaps the most significant is the elimination
of common carriage obligations for provision of broadband access
services as a result of FCC rulings in its Cable Modem Declaratory
Ruling7° and Wireline Broadband Access Order.7 1 In so doing, the
FCC has eliminated the centuries-old solution under the common law
to address problems of economic coercion between the provider of an
essential service or facility and its customers through imposition of
obligations to serve upon reasonable request without unreasonable
discrimination at reasonable (just) prices and with adequate care, skill
and honesty. As a result, not only the traditional statutory regime but
also its common law foundation has been eliminated with regard to
broadband infrastructure.
68. Political Realities, supra note 55, at 788-89; Cherry, supra note 2, at 285-286.
69. THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 250-74 (1995).
70. See generally Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 5.
71. See generally Wireline Broadband Access Order, supra note 6.
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The elimination of the common law scaffolding for application to
broadband infrastructure has triggered debate regarding important
issues related to network neutrality.72 Although lacking a precise
definition, the diversity of goals, problems, and remedies raised in the
network neutrality debate relate to concerns with varying forms of
discrimination by broadband providers against customers or
competitors. 73 The significance to the discussion here is that
elimination of common carriage obligations for the provision of
broadband access services has reintroduced problems of
discrimination that now lack the legally enforceable remedies for
which the common law principles and the later traditional statutory
regime had been erected. Consequently, the dismantling of the
historical legal infrastructure is requiring construction of a new one
for applicability to broadband access services.
As a result, deregulatory telecommunications policies are shifting
the boundaries between the traditional industry-specific and general
business regimes. 74 Given that the general business regime of
antitrust and consumer protection law largely post-dates the
development of the industry-specific legal regimes for common
carriers and public utilities, and has been preempted or superseded by
the industry-specific regimes in numerous cases and circumstances, it
is unclear whether the general business regime will adequately
address situations or circumstances that had previously been
addressed by the traditional industry-specific regimes. "For this
reason, deregulatory policies may generate a legal gap for which
some issues related to consumer sovereignty may no longer be
adequately addressed by either the general business or the
deregulatorily adjusted industry-specific regimes. 75
For broadband access services relative to the narrowband
telecommunications services, the ensuing legal gap between the
72. See Cherry, supra note 7, at 485-90; Cherry, supra note 3, at 29-31.
73. See Cherry, supra note 7, at 485-87.
74. For a detailed discussed of the evolving interrelationship between deregulatory industry-specific
and general business regimes for telecommunications and broadband services in the United States, see
Cherry, supra note 3, at 13-31.
75. See Cherry, supra note 3, at 31.
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general business and industry-specific regimes will likely be
greater.76 This is because the FCC is attempting to construct a new
legal regime under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction under the
Communications Act of 1934-a more constrained scope of
jurisdiction in contrast to the common carriage statutory regime
under Title II-and thereby a new interface with the general business
regime of antitrust and consumer protection law. The adverse
consequences for consumers as opposed to competitors of broadband
providers is particularly troublesome because the network neutrality
debate has tended to be focused primarily on the provider-to-
competitor relationship and "[a]dvocates of a regime based solely on
antitrust fail to explain how the issues pertaining to the provider-to-
customer relationship, that have been governed by the ex ante rules of
industry-specific common carriage regulation, will be adequately
addressed by antitrust ex post remedies." 77 Furthermore, without the
protection of the traditional ex ante rules embedded in common law
common carriage obligations, myriad forms of discrimination are
legally permissible and threaten consumers' ability to have access at
reasonable prices and under reasonable terms and conditions.
3. Importance of Inter-Infrastructure Effects
Unfortunately, the consequences of eliminating common carriage
obligations for broadband access services are not likely to be
contained to just broadband access to the Internet. This is because
the broadband infrastructure both competes and interconnects with
other critical infrastructures.
First, the FCC has now "create[d] intramodal asymmetric
regulation between telecommunications carriers' narrowband and
broadband networks-with common carriage required for the former
but not the latter." 78 Due to the differential economic effects of
differing regulatory obligations on these competing networks, "such
76. Id. at29-31.
77. See Cherry, supra note 7, at 502 (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. at 498 (footnotes omitted).
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asymmetry may ultimately lead to the unavailability of any common
carriage-provided service, whether narrowband or broadband. Thus,
the . . . economic [and welfare] rights of individuals as end users of
both narrowband and broadband services could be adversely
affected., 79 To the extent that broadband networks also compete with
cable and broadcasting networks, the elimination of non-
discrimination obligations-not otherwise provided by other legal
requirements-may also adversely affect citizen's free speech
rights.8 °
Second, the deregulatory broadband policies may ultimately lead
to devastating, unintended consequences for the United States Postal
Service (USPS). "[T]he financial viability of the USPS is now being
threatened, in large part, by electronic substitution of correspondence
over the Internet."1 To address the financial unsustainability of the
USPS' current business model, the President's Commission on the
United States Postal System recommends that the USPS become
more Internet-dependent through both coordination of internal
operations and provision of value-added services to customers. 82 This
raises questions as to the long-term effects of deregulatory broadband
policies on the financial sustainability and ubiquitous deployment of
the postal system:
Will there be de facto erosion of common carriage of the postal
system that adversely affects customers? Will the geographic
availability of postal service significantly deteriorate? What will
be the implications for free speech rights? How might
government interest in viewpoint diversity be adversely
impacted-keeping in mind that postal policies have long played
a significant role in the evolution of the press and other print
media?... It certainly seems incongruous to eliminate common
carriage obligations for providers of broadband Internet access
79. Id. (footnotes omitted).
80. See id. at 505-10; Essentiality ofAccess, supra note 55, at 272-74.
81. See Cherry, supra note 7, at 508 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 509 (footnotes omitted).
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while simultaneously increasing the dependence of the USPS, a
common carrier itself, on the Internet.83
Third, the communications infrastructure interconnects with other
critical infrastructures, such as transportation and electricity. Outages,
failures, and performance characteristics in one infrastructure can
dramatically and adversely affect performance in the others. For
example, transportation networks have become increasingly reliant
on telecommunications services, including airport operations and
highway traffic monitoring and toll systems. Outages in
telecommunications services can trigger congestion and even total
suspension of transportation services for substantial periods of time.
The interdependence of the telecommunications and electricity
networks is demonstrated by the effects of the Northeast Blackout of
2003 on the cellular telecommunications network. A blackout that
began in the electricity grid in Ohio not only cascaded to blackouts in
other states but also disrupted the cellular network as the backup
batteries ran dry prior to restoration of service in the electricity grid.
Potential adverse consequences for transportation and electricity
networks may increase as their interconnection and reliance on
broadband, packet-switched communications services grows.
Fundamental reasons are that packet-switched networks are less
secure and reliable than traditional wireline, circuit-switched
networks, 84 and the Internet is extremely fragile to targeted attacks.
85
To the extent that intramodal asymmetric regulation hastens
substitution of broadband for narrowband networks, higher security
risks and lower network reliability of the communications
infrastructure accelerates with cascading effects to the transportation
and electricity networks.
83. Id. at 509-10 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
84. D. RICHARD KUHN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR VOICE
OVER IP SYSTEMS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND
TECHNOLOGY, NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-58, at 7 (2005), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-58/SP800-58-final.pdf.
85. See ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS & ALESSANDRO VESPIGNANI, EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE
OF THE INTERNET: A STATISTICAL PHYSICS APPROACH, 112-39 (2004).
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D. Importance of Liability Rules
Another way in which telecommunications sector has followed a
different policy trajectory from the transportation sector is with
regard to their respective legal liability regimes. 86  The initial
deviation occurred during the evolution of the traditional, statutory
industry-specific regimes. Over time the common law doctrine had
evolved that limitations of carrier liability in contracts, referred to as
valuation agreements, are not enforceable unless the customer is
given a choice of rates under which full liability is an option and the
rate is tied to the level of liability accepted by the carrier. Meanwhile,
when the statutory industry-specific regime required carriers to file
tariffs containing rates, terms and conditions of services with the
expert regulatory commission, courts developed the filed rate
doctrine in addressing disputes challenging the validity or
reasonableness of tariffs. The filed rate doctrine required that a given
rate and its associated terms and conditions must be applied non-
discriminatorily among customers. In Union Pacific R.R. Co. v.
87Burke, the Supreme Court held that the common law rule affecting
valuation contracts was not altered by the filed rate doctrine
applicable to tariffs filed by railroad carriers. The same result was
effectively applied to telegraph carriers by virtue of the Supreme
Court's decision in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros & Co.
88
and a subsequent order by the Interstate Commerce Commission
(then also with jurisdiction over telegraph and telephone carriers) in
Limitations on Liability in Connection with the Transmission of
Telegraph Messages.89 However, decades later this legal framework
was subsequently misapplied to telephone carriers. Although the
reasons underlying this development are impossible to reiterate here,
the filed rate doctrine has been misapplied by the FCC to uphold the
86. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 311-14; CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 14-28.
87. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1921).
88. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 574-75 (1921).
89. Limitations of Liability in Connection with the Transmission of Telegraph Messages, 61 I.C.C.
541, 550 (1921).
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validity of limitations of liability tariff provisions for telephone
companies (now called telecommunications carriers). 90 As a result,
telecommunications carriers have been permitted to operate under a
legal regime whereby services are rendered pursuant to tariffs
containing an absolute (and relatively low) limit of liability with no
choice for customers to pay a higher rate for which full liability is an
option.
91
The significance of this differential evolution of liability regimes
for telecommunications (telephony) carriers relative to other common
carriers is the corresponding differential effects of detariffing under
deregulatory policies.92 Furthermore, given that liability rules affect
carriers' economic incentives to invest in performance of their
network systems, the differential effects of detariffing create differing
implications for network performance of telecommunications carriers
relative to other common carriers:
The liability regime for telecommunications carriers is shifting
from one based on an absolute limit on liability in tariffs to a
form of strict liability under the common law. By mandatorily
detariffing interstate, interexchange telecommunications
services, the FCC has contributed to the acceleration of this
process but without adequate consideration of the likely impacts
on the achievability of other public policy goals for the
telecommunications industry, such as universal service,
broadband deployment or homeland security. The federal
government's inattention to the changing-potentially
catastrophic levels of-liabilities of telecommunications carriers
90. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 313-16; CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 34-35, 39-42.
91. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 310-316; CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 29-44.
92. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 310-17, 321-24; CRISIS IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 39-42.
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under deregulatory policies stands in stark contrast to its
treatment of other common carriers and public utilities. 93
By contrast, the economic ramifications of imposing detariffing on
other common carriers were not as dramatic because an absolute limit
on liability was never permitted for such carriers as had anomalously
evolved for telephony carriers. In addition, notwithstanding the
greater continuity in liability regimes for transportation than
telecommunications carriers, Congress mandated the Department of
Transportation (DOT)--but not the FCC-to study the impact of
deregulatory legislation on liability rules. DOT has thus far released
two such studies, in 1995 and 1998, exploring liability issues on an
intermodal basis, both domestically and internationally. 9
4
The shift in the liability regime for telecommunications carriers is
also of substantial concern because carriers now confront potential
liability for catastrophic losses. As high risk, high reliability
organizations:
[T]he telecommunications system is characterized by such high
levels of interactive complexity and tight coupling [so] that
accidents of catastrophic potential are inevitable, or normal. In
economic terms, this means that it is impossible for a
telecommunications system to achieve one hundred per cent
reliability, regardless of how much the telecommunications
carrier spends on precautions or system improvements.95
Under these circumstances, it may be necessary to impose an
absolute limit on liability for the aggregate level of damages for
which a carrier would be liable to customers for a single event of
service interruption or outage. 96 "A limit on aggregate liability would
protect carriers from the uncertainty of catastrophic levels of liability
93. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 309.
94. Id. at 323-24.
95. See CRiSIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 88.
96. Id.
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and thereby be more consistent with achievement of ubiquitous
availability of service at reasonable rates."
97
Although the need for unique liability rules for technologies of
high-risk high-reliability organizations has been acknowledged in
other contexts-such as nuclear power plants-it has thus far been
inadequately considered by policy making bodies in the United States
for application to communication networks under deregulatory
policies.98 For this reason, the shift in the liability regime for
telecommunications carriers poses a unique threat to the financial
viability of telecommunications carriers and to the long-term
sustainability, reliability, and ubiquity of communications
infrastructures. 99 Furthermore, as previously discussed, adverse
consequences for telecommunications networks will likely also affect
other critical infrastructures with which they interconnect.
CONCLUSION
Markets require an institutional framework, in which government
plays a critical role, to sustain them. Analogously, an institutional
framework is necessary for the sustainability of critical
infrastructures in modem society. For utility infrastructures, legal
principles embedded in common carriage and public utility law
evolved to ensure that essential public utility services were widely
available under reasonable rates, terms and conditions.
Advances in communications technologies and shifts in reliance
from monopoly to competitive market structures have dramatically
increased the complexity of designing sustainable
telecommunications policies. The collective effect of deregulatory
telecommunications policies--eliminating or eroding the
sustainability of legal principles embedded in common carriage
97. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 328.
98. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 318-21; CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 60-66.
99. See Improving Network Reliability, supra note 17, at 317-21; CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CARRIER LIABILITY, supra note 17, at 88-92.
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obligations, increasing political instability of explicitly funded public
utility programs, and shifting the liability regime for the
telecommunications carriers from an absolute limit on liability to a
form of strict liability under the common law-will adversely affect
the sustainability of communications (narrowband and broadband)
infrastructures with the emergent properties of widespread
availability, affordability and reliability to which we have become
accustomed. Notably, the direct effects of deregulatory policies
implemented thus far for the telecommunications sector pose greater
problems than those for the transportation sector. Unfortunately, the
consequences of deregulatory telecommunications policies will not
be contained to the telecommunications sector but will also likely
cascade to other systems, institutions, and activities that the
communications infrastructures underlie and to other critical
infrastructures-including the transportation and electricity sectors-
with which the communications (narrowband and broadband)
infrastructures interconnect.
Unfortunately, the network neutrality debate in the United States-
triggered by the FCC's elimination of important common law
principles for applicability to broadband-has mischaracterized the
common carriage regime and its relationship to other bodies of law.
The radical nature by which fundamental common law principles
have been eliminated under deregulatory policies for
telecommunications as compared to the transportation industries
remains unrecognized. Furthermore, the distinctive means by which
consumer sovereignty has been pursued under general business
regimes as opposed to industry-specific regimes are also
underappreciated. As a result, there has been a preoccupation with
regulatory policies affecting the wholesale market and
unsubstantiated reliance on antitrust principles to address problems in
the retail market.
Further research is vital for improving our understanding of those
critical legal rules necessary for the sustainability of communications
network infrastructures with the desired emergent properties of
widespread availability, affordability, and reliability. As research
[Vol. 24:4
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progresses, we may better understand how the U.S. common law
principles of common carriers and public utilities were an important
means of fulfilling this function. Furthermore, their elimination
through deregulatory policies, but without replacement by some other
legal rules to fulfill a similar function, may render unsustainable the
development of critical communications infrastructures with the
desired emergent properties.
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